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I. INTRODUCTION
Some parties are placing clauses in their arbitration agreements
providing for heightened judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards in an effort
to safeguard against factual or legal errors made by arbitrators. 1 However,
debate has arisen as to whether federal courts have the jurisdiction to
review arbitration decisions on a heightened basis because the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 2 which sets forth substantive rules governing
arbitration, provides for narrow review. 3 In LaPine Technology Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp.,4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the
Northern District of California, 5 held that courts may review arbitration
awards with scrutiny exceeding the standard of review set forth in the FAA
when the parties agree to such heightened scrutiny. In reversing the district
court's decision, the Ninth Circuit joins the Fifth Circuit;6 however, the
Seventh Circuit has indicated that it would hold that courts have no
jurisdiction to review arbitration awards when the standard of review would
exceed the standard provided for in the FAA. 7 This represents a split of
authority in the circuit courts that may prompt the Supreme Court to review
this issue.
* 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
The American Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing Legal
Education (ALI-ABA) Course of Study provides an example of such a clause:
Upon application by either party to a court for an order confirming, modifying or
vacating the award, the court shall have the power to review (a) whether the
findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator(s) are supported by substantial evidence
and (b) whether, as a matter of law based on such findings of fact, the award
should be confirmed, modified or vacated. Upon such determination, judgment
shall be entered in favor of either party consistent herewith.
Stephen A. Hochman, Alternative Dispute Resolution: How to Use it to Your
Advantage-Model Dispute Resolution Provisions for Use in Commercial Agreements
Between Parties with Equal Bargaining Power, SB41 ALI-ABA 153, 180 (1996).
2 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1995).
3 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1995).
4 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
5 See 909 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
6 See Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
7 See Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501
(7th Cir. 1991).
1085
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
II. JUDICIAL REVIEw UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
The rules of the FAA provide for limited judicial review of arbitration
awards. According to the FAA, a federal court may not vacate an award
unless "(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) there is evidence of partiality or corruption among the arbitrators; (3)
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct which prejudiced the fights of one
of the parties; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers." 8 This standard
of review has been described as "extraordinarily narrow."9 By the letter of
the statute, arbitrators have sole discretion over factual determinations and
legal findings in the absence of misconduct. Although § 10(a) of the FAA
provides that courts may vacate arbitration awards only under the four
circumstances listed above, courts at both the federal and state level have
expanded the scope of review in order to vacate an arbitration award that is
"(1) in 'manifest disregard' of the law, (2) in conflict with a strong 'public
policy,' (3) 'arbitrary and capricious' or 'completely irrational' or (4) fails
to 'draw its essence' from the parties' underlying contract." 10 Even though
courts have expanded judicial review beyond the limited grounds provided
by the FAA, parties are rarely successful in getting a court to vacate
arbitration awards on these judicially created bases.11 Thus, some parties
participating in arbitration are placing clauses in their arbitration
agreements providing for heightened judicial scrutiny in order to protect
against arbitral error that does not fall within the statutory or judicial
categories.
III. PRIOR APPELLATE COURT CASES DISCUSSING WHETHER FEDERAL
COURTS MAY REVIEW ARBITRATION AWARDS ON A HEIGHTENED
BASIS
A. Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.12
8 Gateway Tech., 64 F.3d at 996 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) and Forsythe Int'l,
S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990)).
9 Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990).
10 Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error-An Option to
Consider, 13 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 103, 110 (1997).
11 See id.
12 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
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In Gateway Technologies, MCI Telecommunications (MCI) moved to
vacate an arbitral decision that awarded attorneys' fees and $2,000,000 in
punitive damages to Gateway Technologies, Inc. for breach of contract. 13
The Fifth Circuit held that a federal court has jurisdiction to review an
arbitration award on a heightened basis, upholding a clause stating that the
arbitration award "shall be final and binding on both parties, except that
errors of law shall be subject to appeal." 14 The Fifth Circuit based its
decision on the reasoning set forth in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc.,15 where the Supreme Court stated that the FAA does not
prohibit a court from enforcing arbitration agreement rules that differ from
those provided by the FAA. 16 Thus, the Gateway Technologies district
court committed error by not reviewing the errors of law on a de novo
basis, which was the standard of review intended by the parties. 17
B. Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc. 18
This case was an appeal by the Chicago Typographical Union
challenging an arbitration award favorable to Chicago Sun-Times, Inc. 19
The Seventh Circuit held that the union's appeal was frivolous because the
court had no authority to review the soundness of an arbitration award
absent arbitrator misconduct.2 In other words, a court has no jurisdiction
to review an arbitration award on a heightened basis and must follow the
rules for review set forth in the FAA. The Seventh Circuit indicated that it
13 See id. at 995.
14 Id. at 996.
15 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
16 The Supreme Court made the following pronouncement about arbitration
agreements that provide rules governing the course of the arbitration that differ from
those of the FAA:
It does not follow that the FAA prevents the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself. Indeed, such a
result would be quite inimical to the FAA's purpose of ensuring that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.
Gateway Tech., 64 F.3d at 996 (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 56).
17 See id. at 997.
18 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
19 See id. at 1503.
20 See id. at 1506.
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would not enforce a clause in an arbitration agreement that provided for
expanded judicial review of an arbitration decision. 21 The court stated that
parties "cannot contract for judicial review of that award; federal
jurisdiction cannot be created by contract."22 According to the Seventh
Circuit, the only measure that parties may take to protect against arbitral
error is contracting for review by an appellate arbitration panel.
IV. LAPINE TECHNOLOGY- FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LaPine Technology Corp. (LaPine) instituted proceedings against
Kyocera Corp. (Kyocera) in federal district court claiming breach of
contract after Kyocera refused to sell computer disk drives to LaPine after
agreeing to do so on November 14, 1986.23 Kyocera then moved to compel
arbitration pursuant to section 8.10(d) of the parties' agreement,2 4 which
the court granted. A panel of three arbitrators (the Tribunal) heard the
dispute and issued a final decision on August 24, 1994.25 Three months
later Kyocera filed a Motion to Vacate, Modify and Correct the Arbitral
Award claiming that: "(1) The Tribunal's findings of fact were not
supported by substantial evidence, (2) the Tribunal had made errors of law,
and (3) there existed various statutory grounds for vacatur or modification
under the FAA." 26
21 See id. at 1504.
22 Id.
23 See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1997).
24 The parties' arbitration agreement included the following clause:
(d) Manner. A party desiring to submit a matter to arbitration shall give written
notice to the other parties hereto .... The arbitrators shall decide the matters
submitted based upon the evidence presented, the terms of this Agreement, the
Agreement in Principle and the laws of the State of California. The arbitrator shall
issue a written award which shall state the bases of the award and include detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California may enter judgment upon any award, either by
confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The
Court shall vacate, modify or correct any-award: (i) based upon any of the grounds
referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators' findings of
fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators'
conclusions of law are erroneous.
Id. at 886-887.
25 See id. at 887.
2 6 Id.
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In denying Kyocera's motion to vacate, the district court held that it
would not follow the clause in the arbitration agreement providing for
heightened scrutiny, reasoning that the district court only had jurisdiction to
consider the grounds for vacatur listed in the FAA.27 Using the standard of
review set forth in the FAA, the district court found no basis for vacating
the Tribunal's award and thus confirmed the award.28 Kyocera appealed
this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 9 The Ninth Circuit
framed the issue as whether "federal court review of an arbitration
agreement [is] necessarily limited to the grounds set forth in the FAA or
can the court apply greater scrutiny, if the parties have so agreed?" 30 The
Ninth Circuit answered "no" to the first question and "yes" to the second,
thereby reversing the district court. 31
V. THE NINTH CIRcuIT'S DISCUSSION OF THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
CLAUSES EXPANDING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
The Ninth Circuit based its holding on the principle that the underlying
purpose of the FAA is to guarantee that courts will enforce private
agreements to arbitrate32 and allow parties to determine the guidelines for
their arbitrations. 33 The court stated that "'[a]rbitration under the Act is a
matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure
their arbitration agreements as they see fit.' 34 In support, the Ninth
Circuit cited several Supreme Court cases that stand for the proposition that
courts may enforce clauses in arbitration agreements that differ from the
rules set forth in the FAA. 35
27 See id.
28 See id.
2 9 See id. at 888.
30 Id.
31 See id.
32 Congress enacted the FAA in order to ensure that courts would enforce private
agreements that designated arbitration as the mechanism for dispute resolution. The
legislation stems from the courts' refusal to enforce such agreements. See id. (citing
Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)).
33 See id.
34 Id. (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 56).
35 See, e.g., Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 56 (enforcing an arbitration clause calling
for arbitration of punitive damages despite contrary state law); First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
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The court wholeheartedly agreed with the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Gateway Technologies, which held that federal courts do not supersede
their jurisdiction by reviewing arbitration awards on a heightened basis
when the parties have agreed to such expanded review.36 Quoting from
Gateway Technologies, the Ninth Circuit made the following statement:
"As [the Fifth Circuit] wisely put it: 'Because these parties contractually
agreed to expand judicial review, their contractual provision supplements
the FAA's default standard of review and allows for de novo review of
issues of law embodied in the arbitration award.' 37 The Ninth Circuit also
agreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that refusal to review an arbitral
award on a heightened basis as provided by the parties' agreement is
contrary to federal arbitration policy. 38 According to the court, to hold that
a federal court lacked jurisdiction to review an award with greater scrutiny
than dictated by the FAA "would turn the FAA on its head" 39 because the
purpose of enacting the legislation was to guarantee that parties'
agreements to arbitrate would be enforceable in court.40
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the Seventh Circuit's pronouncement in
Chicago Typographical Union that parties "'cannot contract for judicial
review of [an] award"' 41 as dicta that did not relate to the holding of that
case. 42 The court gave the following explanation as support for its
conclusion that it was correct and the Seventh Circuit was wrong: "if [the
Seventh Circuit] intended to refer to the FAA as a jurisdictional statute, it
would have been negating the established principle that the FAA is a
regulation of commerce rather than a limitation on or conferral of federal
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (enforcing arbitration clauses
limiting what issues may be submitted to arbitration).
36 See LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 889.
37 Id. (quoting Gateway Tech., 64 F.3d at 996).
38 See id.
39 Id.
40 Before Congress enacted the FAA, courts refused to enforce arbitration
agreements because they were wary of whether arbitrators "'possess [ed] adequate
means of giving redress.'" Id. (quoting Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S.
109, 121 (1924)). The courts' apprehension about the adequacy of arbitration decisions
led them to refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate. See id. (citing Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 503 U.S. 265, 271 (1995)).
41 Id. at 890 (quoting Chicago Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1504).
42 See id.
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court jurisdiction." 43 Finding no grounds for holding that federal courts
cannot review an arbitral award on a heightened basis, the court decided to
review the Tribunal's award for substantial evidence and errors of law, as
provided by the parties' agreement. 44
Although the Ninth Circuit admitted that having a court enforce clauses
providing for the scope of judicial review was not the same as enforcing
clauses limiting the scope of the issues subject to arbitration or agreements
to arbitrate, the court reconciled these differences: "[Tihe standards against
which the work of the arbitrator will be measured are inexorably
intertwined with the arbitration's scope, affect its whole structure, and may
even encourage the arbitrator to adhere to a high standard of
decisionmaking." 45 Thus, the court concluded that there was "no sufficient
reason to pay less respect to the review provision than we pay to the
myriad of other agreements which the parties have been pleased to
make. "46
VI. ANALYSIS
Although the Seventh Circuit indicated that it would hold the other
way, LaPine Technology may prompt other circuit courts faced with the
issue to join the Fifth and Ninth Circuit's holdings that federal courts have
the authority to exceed the standard of review provisions set forth in the
FAA. Before the Ninth Circuit ruled, at least one commentator predicted
that the Northern District of California would be reversed, calling the
district court's decision in LaPine Technology an "aberration." 47
Apparently, commentators shared the sentiments expressed in LaPine
Technology and believed that the better argument on this issue was that
parties agreeing to arbitration can contract for any provision they want,
including a provision establishing the scope of review to which the award
will be subjected.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion focused on the idea that arbitration is a
creature of contract. 48 Without discussing the desirability of including
43 Id.
44See id.
45 Id. at 889.
46 Id.
47 Hochman, supra note 10, at 109.
48 See LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 888.
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clauses providing for expanded judicial review in arbitration agreements,
the court decided that failing to enforce any of an arbitration agreement's
clauses would interfere with the intent of the parties. 49 Because the FAA
contains no specific language stating that the narrow standard of review
provided by the statute precludes more expansive review, the court
interpreted the review provision of the FAA as a default standard that can
be altered by contract. 50 This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme
Court's statement in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees,51
that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of
procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability,
according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate." 52 It only
makes sense that parties may contract for any provision they deem
appropriate as long as it is not contrary to law; therefore, the Ninth Circuit
reached the correct result in LaPine Technology.
After LaPine Technology, it is clear that parties within the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits' jurisdiction will have the freedom to contract for expanded
judicial review in their arbitration agreements; however, the question that
remains unanswered is whether such clauses will have a negative or
positive impact on the effectiveness of arbitration as a means of alternative
dispute resolution. Giving parties the power to contract for full judicial
review of an arbitral award may undermine some of the advantages that
arbitration presents. 53 Many parties choose arbitration not only because it is
often more efficient and less expensive than traditional litigation, but also
because of the finality of the award.54 If parties contract for full judicial
review, the finality of the award may no longer exist, and the trial courts
will become appellate courts to parties dissatisfied with the result of the
arbitration. 55 This would undermine the efficiency of arbitration- "rather
49 See id. at 889.
50 In Gateway Technologies, the Fifth Circuit noted that the FAA would govern
review of the arbitration in the absence of a clause providing for expanded review, but
the parties could contract for greater review than the review provided by the FAA. See
Gateway Tech., 64 F.3d at 997 n.3.
51 498 U.S. 468 (1989).
52 Id. at 469.
53 See Hochman, supra note 10, at 106.
54 See id. at 104.
55 See id. at 119.
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than getting arbitration instead of litigation, the parties end up with
arbitration and litigation."56
Although enforcing clauses providing for heightened review of
arbitrators' decisions may have the effect of slowing down the dispute
resolution process, the power of parties to contract for review beyond the
scope provided in the FAA is a benefit that outweighs this potential
drawback. If parties know that courts will enforce scope of review clauses,
they may be more willing to participate in arbitration because they would
not be stuck with arbitral error that does not rise to the level of misconduct
needed before a court can vacate an award under the FAA.57 Allowing a
full judicial review of an arbitral award may not be as efficient as limiting
the scope of review to the grounds set forth in the FAA; however, as
LaPine Technology emphasized, the parties are fully cognizant of the
possibility that the award may not be final because they contracted for the
expanded review. 58 The parties can decide for themselves whether they
think their arbitration agreements should provide for heightened judicial
review, instead of being told that scope of review cannot be a bargained-for
term. LaPine Technology gives parties the freedom to contract for whatever
scope of review they desire (i.e., review of factual findings, errors of law
or both).
It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit decided that the scope of
review clause at issue in that case was entitled to enforcement because
federal arbitration policy mandated it, not because the court thought full
judicial review was a good idea.5 9 According to Stephen Hochman, full
56 Id. at 110.
57 Stephen Hochman made the following assessment regarding the use of
arbitration among parties to commercial agreements:
[B]ecause of... the lack of an effective means of judicial review to correct
arbitral error, there are many who avoid using AAA [American Arbitration
Association] pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their agreements because they have
no confidence that the arbitrators' decision will be as objective, predictable and
correct as one would expect if the decision were made by a highly respected judge
sitting without a jury.
Id. at 104.
58 See LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 889. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[flederal
courts can expand their review of an arbitration award beyond the FAA's grounds,
when (but only to the extent that) the parties have so agreed." Id.
59 See id.
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judicial review may not be very wise.6° He suggests that parties take a
"middle ground" by providing limited judicial review in their arbitration
agreements to correct only errors of law and not factual findings, because
no matter what standard the court uses to review the factual findings of the
arbitrator, the cost and delay of such review would be a burden that "may
well outweigh its benefits." 61 Therefore, although LaPine Technologies
permits full judicial review, it may not be in the parties' best interests to
contract for such an expansive review provision.
VII. CONCLUSION
LaPine Technology stands for the proposition that because arbitration is
a creature of contract, parties are free to set the rules for their arbitration,
and courts will enforce those rules. Parties who have been frustrated by the
narrow review provision set forth in the FAA will rejoice in this holding,
and it may encourage more people to include scope of review clauses in
their arbitration agreements. However, this issue is far from decided
because only the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that such clauses are
enforceable, and the Seventh Circuit has indicated that the FAA prohibits
them. Thus, this issue will need to be examined by the Supreme Court
before parties to arbitration agreements can rest assured that clauses
providing for heightened judicial review will be enforced by the federal
courts.
Even if the Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
the question of whether such clauses are good for arbitration remains
unanswered. While providing for expanded judicial review may keep
arbitrators on their toes, it may lead to a decline in arbitration because the
parties would rather go ahead and litigate if they know that the matter may
end up in court anyway. On the other hand, if parties are not allowed to
alter the scope of review, they may shy away from arbitration for fear that
there would be no relief from some erroneous abrital awards. Thus, it
should be left up to the parties to decide whether they want to expand the
scope of review and that is exactly what LaPine Technologies permits.
Rachel C. Corn
60 See Hoehman, supra note 10, at 119-120.
61 Id. at 120.
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